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Abstract 
We analyse the determinants of the capital structure of 1,054 UK companies from 1991 
to 1997, and the extent to which the influence of these determinants are affected by 
time-invariant firm-specific heterogeneity. Comparing the results of pooled OLS and 
fixed effects panel estimation, we find significant differences in the results. While our 
OLS results are generally consistent with prior literature, the results of our fixed effects 
panel estimation contradict many of the traditional theories of the determinants of 
corporate financial structure. This suggests that results of traditional studies may be 
biased owing to a failure to control for firm-specific, time-invariant heterogeneity. The 
results of our fixed effects panel estimation find larger companies to have higher levels 
of both long-term and short-term debt than do smaller firms; profitability to be 
negatively correlated with the level of gearing, although profitable firms tend to have 
more short-term bank borrowing than less profitable firms, and tangibility to positively 
influence the level of short-term bank borrowing, as well as all long-term debt 
elements. However, the level of growth opportunities appears to have little influence on 
the level of gearing, other than short-term bank borrowing, where a significant negative 
relationship is observed. 
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1 
Testing for Inconsistencies in the Estimation of 
UK Capital Structure Determinants 
  
 
I. Introduction 
The corporate finance literature contains a host of papers examining the nature, and 
determinants, of corporate financial structure. While in general the literature has 
succeeded in establishing some stylised facts relating the debt-equity decision to a 
variety of independent variables, it has largely done so using observations drawn from a 
single period.  In this paper, we analyse capital structure and its determinants for a 
panel of 1,054 listed UK companies over the time period from 1991 to 1997, giving a 
total of 6,001 firm-year observations. The use of panel data not only improves sample 
size relative to single-period cross-sectional analysis, but is also better able to capture 
effects than either cross-sectional or time-series data alone (Hsiao, 1986; Baltagi, 
1995). 
  
We base our analysis on pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) and fixed effects panel 
estimation. OLS estimation — while common in this literature — may be biased, 
owing to a failure to control for time-invariant firm-specific heterogeneity. We 
therefore seek to explicitly test whether prior conclusions regarding the relationship 
between gearing and our independent variables hold once firm-specific, time-invariant 
heterogeneity is controlled for, a factor that has so far received limited attention in the 
capital structure literature. 
 
Prior research for the UK has indicated that both the level of gearing (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995; Bevan and Danbolt, 2002) and the determinants of gearing (Chittenden 
et al., 1996; Michaelas et al., 1999; Bevan and Danbolt, 2002) vary significantly 
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depending on the definition of gearing adopted.  Consequently, in this paper, we base 
the analysis on various components of debt, rather than on more aggregate gearing 
measures.  This rationale is lent support by the fact that while the overall level of 
indebtedness of our sampled firms has remained fairly stable, the relative importance of 
the various components of debt have changed considerably over time.  
 
The results of our pooled OLS analysis are generally consistent with those of existing 
cross-sectional analyses for the UK. However, many of these results are overturned 
under fixed effects panel analysis, highlighting the importance of controlling for fixed 
effects in studies of corporate financial structure.  
 
Our fixed effects estimation finds the level of the various debt components for the 
1991-1997 period (all scaled by the book value of total assets) to be significantly 
related to: company size, with large companies tending to have higher levels of all 
forms of debt other than short-term securitised debt than smaller companies; the level 
of profitability, which is negatively related to all forms of debt except short-term bank 
borrowing, where there is a significant positive correlation, and the proportion of fixed 
to total assets (“tangibility”) of the firm, which is positively correlated with all forms of 
long-term debt and short-term bank borrowing, but insignificantly related to other 
short-term debt elements.  However, gearing appears not to vary significantly with the 
level of growth opportunities, save for a negative relationship with short-term bank 
borrowing.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section II firstly presents our null 
hypotheses based upon the key prior literature on the relationship between gearing and 
each of our four independent variables. We then consider alternative empirical findings 
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in the few studies that control for firm-specific heterogeneity. In section III we explain 
our dataset and methodology, while the results of our pooled OLS and fixed effects 
panel estimation are reported in section IV. Section V summarises and concludes. 
 
II. Literature and Hypotheses 
As argued by Titman and Wessels (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1991), the choice of 
explanatory variables in the analysis of cross-sectional variation in capital structure is 
fraught with difficulty. Following Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Bevan and Danbolt 
(2002), we adopt four key independent variables: the market-to-book ratio (as a proxy 
for growth opportunities); the natural logarithm of sales (as a proxy for company size); 
profitability, and tangibility (proxied by the ratio of fixed to total assets). The 
theoretical considerations and prior empirical evidence with regard to each of the 
independent variables are discussed below. 
 
Growth Opportunities 
Myers (1977) argues that the potential for under-investment or diversion of resources is 
most severe for companies whose value is predominately accounted for by future 
investment opportunities rather than by assets in place.  Lenders may be reluctant to 
provide finance to such firms, although Myers (1977), Barnea et al., (1981), Stohs and 
Mauer (1996), Barclay and Smith (1996, 1999), Michaelas et al., (1999) and Ozkan 
(2000) argue that the relationship between growth opportunities and gearing may be 
different for short and long-term forms of debt, and that the agency problem may be 
mitigated if the firm issues short-term rather than long-term debt.   
 
Consistent with these predictions, Titman and Wessels (1988), Chung (1993), Rajan 
and Zingales (1995), Barclay and Smith (1996) and Chen et al., (1997) all find a 
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negative relationship between growth opportunities and the level of either long-term or 
total debt.  These results are robust to the method of estimation1 and the country under 
study.  However, while Bevan and Danbolt (2002) find a negative correlation between 
gearing and long-term debt, they find total gearing to be positively related to the level 
of growth opportunities.  
 
Bevan and Danbolt (2002) find short-term debt to be positively related to growth 
opportunities, while Stohs and Mauer (1996) and Barclay and Smith (1996) find growth 
firms to have lower levels of all debt types, irrespective of maturity or priority. Thus, 
the evidence of the impact of growth opportunities on the cross-sectional variation in 
corporate gearing is rather mixed.  However, based on the theoretical considerations 
and the majority of the prior empirical evidence, we make the following hypotheses: 
H1: The levels of long-term debt components are negatively related to the 
level of growth opportunities. 
H2: The levels of short-term debt components are positively related to the 
level of growth opportunities. 
 
Size 
Rajan and Zingales (1995, p. 1451) argue that “Larger firms tend to be more diversified 
and fail less often, so size … may be an inverse proxy for the probability of 
bankruptcy”.  Conversely, Smith and Warner (1979) and Michaelas et al., (1999) argue 
that the agency conflict between shareholders and lenders may be particularly severe 
for small companies.  Lenders can manage the risk of lending to small companies by 
restricting the length of maturity offered.  Small companies can therefore be expected 
                                                 
1 For example Chen et al., (1997) and Bevan and Danbolt (2002) use OLS; Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
and Bevan and Banbolt (2002) use censored Tobit, while Titman and Wessels (1988) apply maximum 
likelihood linear structural relationship estimation. Barclay and Smith (1996) do not specify the 
estimation technique used.  We return to this issue below. 
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to have less long-term debt — but possibly more short-term debt — than larger 
companies (Barnea et al., 1980; Whited, 1982; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Stohs and 
Mauer, 1996). 
 
Once again, however, the empirical evidence is inconclusive.  At the aggregate level, 
Crutchley and Hanson (1989), Bennett and Donnelly (1993), Rajan and Zingales 
(1995), Barclay and Smith (1996), and Bevan and Danbolt (2002) find a significant 
positive correlation between company size and gearing, while Marsh (1982) observes 
that debt issues are positively correlated with company size. However, Remmers et al., 
(1974) find no size effect and Kester (1986) reports an insignificant negative 
correlation between gearing and company size.  Barclay and Smith (1996), Stohs and 
Mauer (1996), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) all find debt maturity to be 
positively correlated with company size.  However, Bevan and Danbolt (2002) find the 
relationship between company size and gearing to depend significantly on the specific 
debt element analysed: large companies tend to use more long-term debt, trade credit 
and short-term securitised debt, but less short-term bank financing than smaller 
companies.  Despite some contradictory evidence, the weight of available empirical 
evidence finds debt maturity to be positively correlated with company size.  
 
We therefore hypothesise: 
H3: The levels of long-term debt components are positively related to 
company size. 
H4: The levels of short-term debt components are negatively related to 
company size. 
 
Profitability 
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Extending the analysis from the capital structure irrelevancy propositions of their 1958 
paper, Modigliani and Miller (1963) argue that, due to the tax deductibility of interest 
payments, companies may prefer debt to equity.  This would suggest that highly 
profitable firms would choose to have high levels of debt in order to obtain attractive 
tax shields.  However, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) argue that interest tax shields may 
be unimportant to companies with other tax shields, such as depreciation2. 
 
Alternatively, Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) predict that, as a result of 
asymmetric information, companies will prefer internal to external capital sources. 
Thus a pecking-order is established, whereby companies with high levels of profits tend 
to finance investments with retained earnings rather than by the raising of debt finance.  
Consistent with this theory, Toy et al., (1974), Kester (1986), Titman and Wessels 
(1988), Bennett and Donnelly (1993), Rajan and Zingales (1995), and Bevan and 
Danbolt (2002) all find gearing to be negatively related to the level of profitability.  
Consequently, we hypothesise: 
H5: The level of gearing is negatively related to the level of profitability. 
 
Tangibility 
Due to the conflict of interest between debt providers and shareholders (Jensen and 
Mekling, 1976), lenders face the risk of adverse selection and moral hazard.  
Consequently, lenders may demand security, and collateral value may be a major 
determinant of the level of debt finance available to companies (Scott, 1977; Stiglitz 
and Weiss, 1981; Williamson, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1990). 
  
                                                 
2 Based on DeAngelo and Masulis’ (1980) argument, one would expect companies with large amounts of 
depreciation to have relatively low levels of debt.  If fixed assets proxy for the availability of such non-
interest tax shields, DeAngelo and Masulis’ theory would imply a negative correlation between 
tangibility and gearing, contrary to what is generally observed (see section on tangibility below).  In their 
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Bradley et al., (1984), Titman and Wessels (1988), and Rajan and Zingales (1995) find 
a significant positive relationship between tangibility and total gearing, while Marsh 
(1982) and Walsh and Ryan (1997) find the probability of debt issues to be positively 
related to the fixed asset ratio.  However, Chittenden et al., (1996) and Bevan and 
Danbolt (2002) find the relationship between tangibility and gearing to depend on the 
measure of debt applied.  While these studies find tangibility to be positively correlated 
with long-term forms of debt, a negative correlation is observed for short-term debt 
elements.  Similarly, Stohs and Mauer (1996) find debt maturity to be highly correlated 
with asset maturity, providing strong support for the maturity matching principle 
(Brealey and Myers (2000)).  However, Bennett and Donnelly (1993) find a positive 
correlation between gearing and collateral value for total and short-term debt, but not 
for long-term debt.   
 
Despite some inconsistency in the prior evidence, we hypothesise: 
H6: The levels of long-term debt components are positively related to the 
level of tangibility. 
H7: The levels of short-term debt components are negatively related to the 
level of tangibility. 
 
Influence of Estimation Technique 
 
The analyses considered in the preceding discussion utilise a variety of alternative 
estimation techniques and explanatory variables.  However, despite these variations, 
many of these empirical analyses may be subject to biases owing to a failure to control 
for time–invariant but firm-specific effects. Failure to control for such heterogeneity 
entails that the disturbance term in a classical linear regression will incorporate time-
                                                                                                                                              
empirical analysis, Bradley et al., (1984) find no support for DeAngelo and Masulis’ tax-based theory.  
 8
invariant omitted factors. Consequently, if these omitted factors are contemporaneously 
correlated with the included independent variables — as is the underlying assumption 
of the fixed effects model — parameter estimation will be rendered biased and 
inconsistent3.  Hence, inferences based upon parameters estimated without controlling 
for firm heterogeneity may lead to inappropriate conclusions (Baltagi, 1995).  By 
transforming the model to eliminate time-invariant effects that vary by enterprise, the 
parameters of the fixed effects model are BLUE under OLS estimation. It is therefore 
important to test whether prior conclusions regarding the relationship between gearing 
and our independent variables are robust, or whether the results change when firm-
specific, time-invariant heterogeneity is controlled for.  
 
Indeed, it is interesting to note that studies that have applied fixed effects estimation, or 
other forms of estimation which control for firm effects, at times obtain results that 
contradict some of the results of the studies discussed above, which do not control for 
time-invariant, firm-specific effects. For instance: 
 
• Size — Berger et al., (1997) find the positive relationship between gearing and 
company size to hold regardless of whether the regressions are estimated using 
OLS, random effects or fixed effects panel estimation, and Lasfer (1995) and Ozkan 
(2000, 2001) – who control for firm heterogeneity through random effect and 
generalised method of moments (GMM) estimation respectively – obtain results 
similar to prior studies which have failed to control for such effects. However, van 
der Wijst and Thurik (1993) and Barclay et al., (1995) find their results to depend 
on whether the estimation is undertaken using OLS or fixed effects.  Van der Wijst 
and Thurik find both short and long-term gearing to be positively related to 
                                                 
3 The coefficient of correlation between the firm-specific error term and the matrix of independent 
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company size, although the regression coefficients are much smaller under fixed 
effects than OLS estimation, and no longer statistically significant.  Barclay et al., 
find an even larger change in the coefficients, with the correlation between size and 
total gearing reversing polarity, from significantly negative under pooled OLS to 
significantly positive under fixed-effects panel estimation. 
 
• Tangibility — van der Wijst and Thurik (1993) find these regression coefficients 
to be somewhat smaller in magnitude with fixed effects than with OLS estimation, 
although still significant for short and long-term debt.  However, the tangibility 
coefficient is no longer significant for total debt when estimated using fixed 
effects.  Berger et al., (1997) find the coefficient for the relationship between asset 
collateral value and total gearing to change from insignificantly positive using 
OLS, to highly significantly negative when estimated using fixed effects.  
However, similar to prior studies (such as e.g., Stohs and Mauer, 1996), Ozkan 
(2000) find debt maturity to be highly correlated with asset maturity, consistent 
with the hypotheses based on the extant literature. 
 
However, as noted in the section on growth opportunities above, the prior literature 
suggests that the relationship between growth opportunities and gearing appears to be 
robust to the method of estimation.  This also holds for studies controlling for fixed 
firm-effects: Barclay et al., (1995), Michaelas et al., (1999), Lasfer (1995) and Ozkan 
(2000, 2001) all obtain coefficients similar to those of analyses which do not control for 
firm-specific and time-invariant heterogeneity. Michaelas et al., (1999) find long-term 
and total debt to be positively related to the market-to-book (MTB) variable, and 
Berger et al., (1997) find changes in total gearing ratios to be positively related to the 
                                                                                                                                              
variables reported in table 2 (corr(ui, x)) provides an indication of the extent of this bias in each equation. 
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market-to-book ratio.  In addition, Berger et al., (1997) find the significant negative 
relationship between profitability and gearing to be robust to whether the estimation is 
based on OLS or fixed effects, as does Ozkan (2001).   
  
Hence, there does appear to be at least some evidence suggesting results will depend 
upon whether or not firm-specific, time-invariant heterogeneity is controlled for. The 
coefficients obtained in studies that have failed to control for such effects may be 
biased, and the conclusions drawn, unreliable. The literature that attempts to control for 
firm-specific fixed effects suggests that these effects are likely to manifest themselves 
through the relationship between gearing and both size and tangibility. Consequently, 
we test for the extent, and implications, of this bias in section IV, through comparison 
of the results obtained using pooled OLS and fixed effects estimation techniques on our 
sample of UK firms. 
  
III. Data and Methodology 
 
Our dataset is derived from Datastream and contains accounting information for all 
listed non-financial UK companies over the time period from 1991 to 1997.  In order to 
mitigate survivorship bias, companies are included in the analysis even if data is not 
available for every year.  Consequently, the number of observations in each year vary, 
with a total of 6,001 firm-year observations on 1,054 companies4. While our assembled 
data was relatively clean, outliers were identified. In order to eliminate these it was 
necessary to winsorise all dependent and independent variables at the 2½ percent level5. 
 
                                                 
4 The analysis was also undertaken on a balanced panel of 550 companies for which information was 
available in every year.  The results for this balanced panel (not reported) are very similar to the results 
for the non-balanced panel reported below. 
5 For details on the winsorising process, see Tuckey (1962). 
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Previous studies have suggested that the level of gearing depends significantly on the 
definition of gearing applied. In this study we therefore concentrate on a variety of long 
and short-term debt components rather than on the more aggregate gearing measures. 
Following the methodology established by Bevan and Danbolt (2002), we decompose 
debt into a series of long and short-term elements. All gearing measures are scaled by 
the book value of total assets and their precise definitions and a discussion of their 
levels and time series patterns are presented in appendix I. 
 
Following Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Bevan and Danbolt (2002), we analyse the 
determinants of capital structure with reference to four key corporate characteristics: 
the level of growth opportunities; company size; profitability, and tangibility.  Precise 
definitions of the independent variables are presented in appendix II. Appendix II also 
discusses the key features of the independent variables and their time series patterns. 
 
In order to isolate the analysis from the potential reverse causality which exists between 
the independent and dependent variables, most empirical studies of capital structure lag 
their independent variables, which are typically a smoothed series (see e.g., Titman and 
Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Bevan and Danbolt, 2002) and we follow 
this technique here. Hence we define our independent variables as lagged three year 
averages6. Our estimated relationship is thus: 
 
 ( )3,3,3,3,, ,,, −−−−= tititititi yTangibilitfitabilityProLogsaleMTBfGearing   (1) 
 
where gearing refers to each of the individual gearing measures (as specified in 
appendix I), i refers to the individual firms, t to the time period of the gearing measure 
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(measured at the accounting year end), and t-3 to the average for the previous three 
years. 
 
IV. Empirical Results 
 
Table 1 presents the results of our pooled OLS regression analysis.  At the aggregate 
level, we find that our regressions are highly significant, and we are able to reject the 
null hypothesis of joint insignificance of our coefficients at less than the one percent 
level.  Analysis of the individual debt elements reveals a series of equations that are 
significant at less than the one percent level, although the R2 measure differs 
significantly among them, from a low of 2.41 percent for short-term securitised debt, to 
a high of 19.57 percent for trade credit. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
The results of our fixed effects estimation are presented in table 2. Comparison of the 
results presented in tables 1 and 2 suggests that the explanatory power of the 
regressions are lower under fixed effects estimation than under pooled OLS, similar to 
the findings of Barclay et al., (1995) and Berger et al., (1997).  The failure to control 
for firm effects when companies are included in the sample more than once — as in our 
sample — may cause “…a potential overstatement of the t-statistics in the pooled 
regressions.” (Barclay et al., 1995, p. 14)7.  Nevertheless, we continue to be able to 
reject joint insignificance of our coefficients at less than the one percent level in all 
cases other than our short-term securitised debt measure where the regression is 
                                                                                                                                              
6 We also performed the same regression analysis with non-averaged one year lags of the independent 
variables, with no significant change in the results. 
7 As Barclay et al (1995) note, the extent of this influence is exacerbated by the fact that gearing tends to 
be highly autoregressive. Hence, in such circumstances, a failure to control for time-invariant firm-
specific factors will lead to an upwards bias in the significance of estimated coefficients under pooled 
OLS.  
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significant at the 10 percent level. Moreover, the computed Hausman statistics reject 
random effects in favour of our chosen fixed effects model.  
 
 [INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
Market-to-Book 
The pooled OLS results in table 1 uncover a positive correlation between the market-to-
book ratio and total liabilities, indicating that firms with growth opportunities tend to 
hold more debt — a result which contradicts a great deal of the literature, but concurs 
with previous findings by Chittenden et al., (1996), Michaelas et al., (1999) and Bevan 
and Danbolt (2002).  Our pooled OLS results illustrate that total long-term debt is also 
positively correlated with growth opportunities, while long-term bank borrowing and 
securitised debt are of a positive sign, but not significant. Hence, on the basis of pooled 
OLS estimation, there does not appear to be any bias against growth companies in the 
long-term debt markets, and we therefore reject hypothesis 1.   
 
By contrast, we are unable to reject hypothesis 2 at the aggregate short-term debt level, 
as we find total current liabilities to be positively correlated with growth opportunities. 
However, as we further disaggregate short-term debt, we find that while trade credit 
and equivalent and short-term securitised debt are also positively correlated with 
market-to-book, short-term bank borrowing is negatively correlated. Consequently, we 
reject hypothesis 2 in this case and interpret this as indicating that banks are reluctant to 
extend short-term finance to companies with growth potential rather than proven assets 
in place.  
 
However, comparing the coefficients of the pooled OLS and fixed effects models 
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illustrates that controlling for underlying time-invariant heterogeneity in our sample has 
a significant effect on our results. We find that the previous positive correlation 
between the market-to-book measure and both total debt and total long-term debt 
becomes insignificant under fixed effects estimation. Therefore, controlling for time-
invariant heterogeneity eliminates the influence of growth opportunities upon these 
measures, while the influence upon long-term bank debt and securitised debt remain 
insignificant. Consequently, we again reject hypothesis 1, but for different reasons than 
previously. 
 
Moreover, we find that the correlation between growth opportunities and total current 
liabilities reverses sign from pooled OLS to fixed effects estimation, becoming 
negative and significant, and leading to a rejection of hypothesis 2 in this case. This 
change of sign is reflected by changes in the coefficients at the sub-current liabilities 
level, with the coefficients upon trade credit and equivalent and short-term securitised 
debt becoming insignificant.  Thus, once firm-effects are controlled for, the level of 
growth opportunities has very little impact in the level of gearing, with the exception 
that growth firms have significantly less short-term bank borrowing than companies 
with lower levels of growth opportunities. This finding is in contrast to existing 
literature which finds the influence of growth opportunities to be robust to the method 
of estimation. 
 
Size 
We find size to be positively correlated with total debt and all long-term debt elements 
under pooled OLS estimation — hence we fail to reject hypothesis 3. We are, however, 
able to reject hypothesis 4 at the level of total short-term debt, as we find size to be 
positively correlated with total current liabilities.  
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 This result can be explained more readily by the results at a further level of 
disaggregation. The negative and significant correlation between short-term bank debt 
and size indicates that lenders do indeed appear to minimise the risk of lending to 
smaller companies by restricting loan maturity. Hence, while we reject hypothesis 4 at 
the aggregate short-term debt level, we fail to reject it in the case of short-term bank 
debt under pooled OLS estimation. Conversely, the positive and significant correlation 
between size and short-term securitised debt suggest that smaller companies are less 
able to issue paper. The positive correlation between size and trade credit and 
equivalent may reflect the fact that larger companies are more able to extract trade 
credit from suppliers, and/or that suppliers are more willing to extend trade credit to 
larger customers. This may result from large firms being perceived to have lower risk 
of default. 
 
The influence of company size on each of our debt measures does not change 
substantially under our different estimation techniques, although as comparison of the 
results presented in tables 1 and 2 illustrates, there are some slight changes in the 
magnitude and significance of the coefficients. We thus again fail to reject hypothesis 3 
and reject hypothesis 4 at the aggregate level, as under pooled OLS. Once again, 
however, short-term bank borrowing and securitised debt are exceptions: both of these 
coefficients change sign once we control for fixed effects, but while the size coefficient 
in the short-term securitised debt regression becomes insignificantly negative, that on 
short-term bank debt reverses sign and becomes positive and significant. Hence in these 
cases we find support for the finding of Barclay et al., (1995) that the correlation 
between size and debt reverses sign when the estimation technique is changed from 
pooled OLS to fixed effects.  The missing variable bias of pooled OLS thus appears to 
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have some influence on the estimation of the relationship between gearing and 
company size. With the exception of short-term securitised debt and size, where the 
regression coefficient is negative and insignificant rather than positive and significant 
as under pooled OLS, we find a positive relationship between company size and all 
debt elements, including short term bank debt, once time-invariant heterogeneity is 
controlled for.  
 
Profitability 
Our pooled OLS results uncover a negative and significant correlation between 
profitability and all debt forms, and hence we are unable to reject hypothesis 5. Our 
results are thus consistent with the pecking-order theory, but contradict the tax shield 
hypothesis.  
 
As the results presented in table 2 illustrate, although controlling for time-invariant 
heterogeneity leads to some slight changes in the magnitude and significance of the 
regression coefficients generally (most notably in the case of total current liabilities 
which loses significance), polarity remains constant save for short-term bank debt. The 
significant negative coefficients for profitability suggest that we are still unable to 
reject the pecking-order explanation for all debt forms other than short-term bank 
borrowing, where a significant positive regression coefficient is observed. Thus, similar 
to Berger et al., (1997), we find the method of estimation to have only marginal impact 
on the estimated relationship between gearing and profitability. 
 
Tangibility 
Finally, we are also unable to reject hypotheses 6 and 7 under pooled OLS estimation. 
We find tangibility to be positively correlated with all long-term debt elements and 
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negatively correlated with all types of short-term debt. Hence, we are able to support 
the collateral explanation in the case of long-term debt, and the maturity matching 
principle in the case of short-term debt. It is notable, however, that at the aggregate 
level total debt is found to be negatively correlated with tangibility, a result that 
confirms prior findings by Bevan and Danbolt (2002). 
 
However, as do Berger et al., (1997), we find the influence of tangibility on the level of 
total debt to reverse sign when estimated using fixed effects rather than OLS.  While 
Berger et al., find the impact of collateral value on total gearing to change from 
insignificantly positive with OLS to significantly negative with fixed effects, we find 
the tangibility coefficient changes from significantly negative under OLS to become 
positive and significant under the fixed effects model. The change in the sign of our 
coefficient from OLS to panel estimation is driven by the change of sign and loss of 
significance of total current liabilities. In turn, this change occurs as both trade credit 
and short-term securitised debt reverse sign and lose significance, and as the correlation 
between tangibility and short-term bank borrowing reverses sign to become positive 
and significant. Hence, once we control for time-invariant heterogeneity, we reject 
hypothesis 7, suggesting that collateral is not only correlated with the level of long-
term debt, but is also a determining factor in obtaining short-term bank finance. Our 
results thus suggest that banks condition their lending — whether long-term or short-
term — on the availability of collateral value. The positive tangibility coefficient for 
short-term bank borrowing contradicts the maturity matching principle.  
 
The results of this section have therefore illustrated that controlling for underlying 
time-invariant heterogeneity through estimating a fixed effects model overturns several 
of the results obtained under OLS.  As illustrated in Table 3, the estimated relationships 
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between short term debt and both the market-to-book and tangibility variables change 
significantly depending on whether the estimation is undertaken using pooled OLS or 
fixed effects panel estimation.  There are also significant changes for individual debt 
components, highlighting the importance of basing the analysis on decomposed debt 
elements. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
 
Our analysis rejects hypothesis 1, and once we control for firm-specific time-invariant 
heterogeneity, we also reject hypothesis 2.  Thus, contrary to expectations, we find that 
growth firms have less short-term but not long-term debt, than low market-to-book 
companies.  Overall, the level of growth opportunities appear to have relatively little 
influence on the level of gearing.   
 
While we fail to reject hypothesis 3 of a positive correlation between size and the level 
of long-term debt, we find large companies also to have more short-term debt than 
smaller companies, contrary to hypothesis 4.  If we can regard size as an inverse proxy 
for the probability of bankruptcy, this suggests that default risk affects short-term as 
well as long-term lending decisions in our sample. Moreover, this finding, coupled with 
the fact that large firms have been found to have higher gearing levels per se, suggests 
that small firms are unable to utilise short-term finance to compensate for their 
restricted access to long-term debt financing.  
 
Consistent with the pecking-order theory, and therefore hypothesis 5, we generally find 
a negative correlation between profitability and gearing.  However, we observe a 
significant positive correlation between short-term bank borrowing and the level of 
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profitability once firm effects are controlled for.  Although in a reduced form analysis 
such as ours it is not possible to separate out the demand and supply elements, one 
possible interpretation is that banks have conditioned the provision of short-term debt 
financing on the earnings capacity of the firm.  
 
We do, however, also find short-term bank debt to be positively correlated with 
tangibility, contrary to the maturity–matching principle.  While the results of our OLS 
and fixed effects estimation both support hypothesis 6, which predicted a positive 
correlation between tangibility and the level of long-term debt, there is no evidence of a 
negative relationship between tangibility and short-term debt in the fixed effects 
estimation.  We therefore reject hypothesis 7. Instead our finding of a positive 
correlation between short-term bank debt and tangibility suggests that collateral may be 
equally important for short-term as for long-term debt, once we control for firm-
specific fixed effects.  
 
V. Summary and Conclusions 
The literature on corporate financial structure has established a series of stylised facts 
relating the corporate debt-equity decision to a variety of independent variables. The 
majority of these stylised facts have, however, been established within the context of a 
single period framework. Moreover, many of the most influential studies have failed to 
control for firm-specific time-invariant heterogeneity, and hence have potentially 
suffered from inherent biases. Our analysis in this paper has therefore explicitly tested 
the influence of firm-specific fixed effects on corporate financial structure, through 
estimating pooled OLS and fixed effects models using the same panel dataset of non-
financial UK firms for the period 1991 to 1997, and directly comparing the results of 
the alternative estimation techniques. Moreover, by conducting our analysis with 
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dependent variables based upon individual components of debt structure, we have 
mitigated the potential for bias induced by the choice of gearing measure.  
 
While the results based on pooled OLS were found to generally support the conclusions 
from existing cross-sectional analysis, many of these conclusions were overturned 
under fixed effects estimation. Failure to control for firm effects may therefore 
introduce a serious bias into the analysis of corporate financial structure, and calls into 
question some of the conclusions drawn from more traditional analyses. In particular, 
our robust fixed effects model suggests the following relationships between debt and 
our four explanatory variables:  
• The level of growth opportunities appears to have little influence on debt levels, 
save for a negative correlation with short-term bank borrowing. There is thus no 
indication that growth firms suffer relatively to other firms in terms of access to 
long-term debt finance; 
• Company size is positively correlated with all debt elements, bar short-term 
securitised debt, where there is no relationship with size. Small firms thus 
appear to be unable to compensate for their restricted access to long-term debt 
financing by increased short-term borrowing; 
• Profitability is negatively related to all debt elements, except for total current 
liabilities where we find no significant correlation, and short-term bank debt 
where we find a significant positive correlation. The latter result suggests that 
liquidity may be an important determinant of short-term bank financing, 
• Tangibility is positively correlated with short-term bank borrowing, as well as 
all long-term debt elements. Collateral thus appears to influence all bank 
borrowing, whether short-term or long-term. 
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Appendix I: Dependent Variable Definitions and Time Series Patterns  
Our various gearing elements are defined as follows: 
TLIABS Total liabilities, which is the sum of total long term debt (TLTD) and 
total current liabilities (TCL); 
TLTD  Total long term debt (repayable in more than one year), consisting of 
long term bank borrowing (BBGT1) and long term securitised debt 
(LTSD); 
BBGT1 Bank borrowing repayable in more than one year;  
LTSD Long term securitised debt (non-bank borrowing repayable in more 
than one year); 
TCL  Total current liabilities (repayable in less than one year), consisting of 
trade credit and equivalent (TTCE), bank borrowing repayable in less 
than one year (BBLT1), and short-term securitised debt (STSD); 
TTCE Total trade credit and equivalent; 
BBLT1 Bank borrowing repayable in less than one year (including proportion 
of long term loans repayable within one year); and 
STSD Short-term securitised debt (non-bank borrowing repayable in less 
than one year). 
 
Summary statistics for the various debt elements are contained in table A1.  From this 
table it can be seen that the book value of total liabilities on average accounted for 
49.41 percent of the book value of total assets in 1991.  The vast majority of the 
liabilities are of a short-term nature, with only 17.36 percent of total liabilities (8.58 
percent of total assets) accounted for by borrowing repayable in more than one year.  
From table A1, it can further be seen that trade credit and equivalent make up a 
significant proportion of company financing. 
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 [INSERT TABLE A1 HERE] 
 
Over the period from 1991 to 1997, the overall level of indebtedness of the average UK 
company has not changed significantly.  However, there have been several significant 
changes in the relative importance of the various components of debt.  This highlights 
the limitations of studies of capital structure based on more aggregate gearing 
measures.  Over the period of analysis, there has been a statistically significant increase 
in the average level of long term debt, from 8.58 percent of total assets, to 9.72 percent.  
This increase was predominately accounted for by the (marginally significant) increase 
in the level of securitised debt, although a small increase in long term bank borrowing 
was also observed. 
 
However, the increase in long-term forms of debt were more than offset by a general 
fall in the level of current liabilities, leading to a very small decline in the overall level 
of indebtedness.  The overall fall in current liabilities of 1.64 percentage points is 
driven by a highly significant decline in the average level of short-term bank 
borrowing, from 8.49 percent of total assets to 5.34 percent.  This is partly offset by a 
significant increase in the reliance on trade credit and other current liabilities. 
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Appendix II: Independent Variable Definitions and Time Series Patterns 
Our various independent variables are defined as follows: 
MTB Market-to-book ratio: the ratio of the book value of total assets (TA) 
less the book value of equity capital and reserves (ECR) plus the 
market value of equity (MV), to the book value of total assets 
(Equation A1); 
 
TA
MVECRTAMTB +−=     (A1) 
 
LOGSALES The natural logarithm of sales (Equation A2); 
 
)(SalesLnLOGSALE =      (A2) 
 
PROFITABILITY The ratio of earnings before interest, tax and depreciation 
(EBITDA), to the book value of total assets (Equation A3); 
 
TA
EBITDAITYPROFITABIL =     (A3) 
 
TANGIBILITY The ratio of the book value of depreciated fixed assets (FA) to that of 
total assets (Equation A4); 
 
TA
FAYTANGIBILIT =      (A4) 
 
Summary statistics for the explanatory variables are provided in table A2.  
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 [INSERT TABLE A2 HERE] 
 
On average, net (depreciated) fixed assets accounted for 35 percent of total assets in 
1991 (based on the average for 1988-1990), a level not much different in 1997.  Over 
the time period from the late 1980s to the mid 1990s, the average level of profitability 
fell from 16.02 percent to 13.08 percent.  The mean level of turnover (expressed in 
1996 values, adjusting nominal values by the GDP deflator (Stationery Office, 1998)) 
rose significantly from a mean of £63m for the time period 1988-1990 to £103m for 
1994-1996.  The market-to-book (MTB) value at 1.4618 for 1991 indicates that book 
values do not adequately reflect the value of UK companies.  If book values provide 
fair estimates of replacement values or the value of assets in place, a market-to-book 
value substantially in excess of unity indicates that UK companies on average have 
valuable investment opportunities8.  By the mid 1990s, the growth prospects of UK 
companies had improved, with the mean MTB value for 1997 (based on 1994-1996) of 
1.5747. 
                                                 
8 An MTB ratio in excess of unity does not unequivocally indicate that a company has valuable growth 
opportunities, as the MTB ratio will also exceed unity if the company has invested in positive NPV 
projects.  However, while MTB may not directly measure growth opportunities, it provides a good proxy.  
Barclay and Smith (1999) find the MTB variable to produce results very similar to those obtained with 
other proxies for growth opportunities in cross-sectional regressions of capital structure.  For a discussion 
of the measurement of growth opportunities, see Danbolt et al., (2002). 
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 Table 1 
 Pooled OLS Analysis of Determinants of Decomposed Debt Elements in the UK 
         TLIABS TLTD BBGT1 LTSD TCL TTCE BBLT1 STSD
         
Constant  0.3795*** 
(0.0159) 
-0.0937*** 
(0.0088) 
 0.0141** 
(0.0063) 
-0.1085*** 
(0.0057) 
 0.4650*** 
(0.0140) 
 0.2845*** 
(0.0119) 
 0.1680*** 
(0.0073) 
 0.0080*** 
(0.0027) 
MTB  0.0385*** 
(0.0051) 
 0.0060** 
(0.0026) 
 0.0022 
(0.0018) 
 0.0015 
(0.0014) 
 0.0327*** 
(0.0044) 
 0.0329*** 
(0.0036) 
-0.0044** 
(0.0020) 
 0.0018*** 
(0.0007) 
Logsales  0.0161*** 
(0.0013) 
 0.0136*** 
(0.0007) 
 0.0027*** 
(0.0005) 
 0.0111*** 
(0.0005) 
 0.0030*** 
(0.0011) 
 0.0084*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0061*** 
(0.0005) 
 0.0007*** 
(0.0002) 
Profit -0.5221*** 
(0.0366) 
-0.1746*** 
(0.0178) 
-0.1052*** 
(0.0130) 
-0.0575*** 
(0.0106) 
-0.3268*** 
(0.0330) 
-0.0955*** 
(0.0253) 
-0.1470*** 
(0.0170) 
-0.0492*** 
(0.0062) 
Tang -0.1482*** 
(0.0117) 
 
 0.1226*** 
(0.0073) 
 
 0.0389*** 
(0.0053) 
 
 0.0797*** 
(0.0045) 
 
-0.2765*** 
(0.0105) 
 
-0.2712*** 
(0.0080) 
 
-0.0167*** 
(0.0056) 
 
 0.0092*** 
(0.0019) 
  
R2 0.0999        
        
        
      
0.1273 0.0284 0.1590 0.1557 0.1957 0.0518 0.0241
F 132.35*** 223.68*** 38.88*** 224.60*** 226.44*** 360.71*** 73.69*** 27.39***
N 6001 6001 6001 6001 6001
 
6001 6001 6001
  
*, ** and  ***, significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively, using a two-tailed t-test.  All dependent and independent variables are scaled by total 
assets. TLIABS refers to total liabilities, which is defined as the sum of total long term debt and total current liabilities; TLTD refers to total long term debt 
(repayable in more than one year); BBGT1 refers to bank borrowing repayable in more than one year; LTSD refers to long term securitised debt; TCL refers 
to total current liabilities; TTCE refers to total trade credit and equivalent; BBLT1 refers to bank borrowing repayable in less than one year and STSD refers 
to short-term securitised debt.  White-adjusted  (White, 1980) standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
 Table 2 
 Fixed Effects Panel Analysis of Determinants of Decomposed Debt Elements in the UK 
    TLIABS TLTD BBGT1 LTSD TCL TTCE BBLT1 STSD
         
Constant  0.0419 
(0.0543) 
-0.1319*** 
(0.0365) 
-0.0364 
(0.0271) 
-0.0499** 
(0.0220) 
 0.1820*** 
(0.0436) 
 0.1493*** 
(0.0344) 
-0.0251 
(0.0322) 
 0.0205* 
(0.0108) 
MTB -0.0030 
(0.0044) 
 0.0029 
(0.0030) 
 0.0019 
(0.0022) 
 0.0002 
(0.0018) 
-0.0076** 
(0.0038) 
 0.0008 
(0.0028) 
-0.0155*** 
(0.0026) 
 0.0001 
(0.0009) 
Logsales  0.0364*** 
(0.0046) 
 0.0167*** 
(0.0031) 
 0.0057** 
(0.0023) 
 0.0074*** 
(0.0019) 
 0.0196*** 
(0.0039) 
 0.0171*** 
(0.0029) 
 0.0061** 
(0.0028) 
-0.0001 
(0.0009) 
Profit -0.0676** 
(0.0333) 
-0.0411* 
(0.0224) 
-0.0315* 
(0.0166) 
-0.0230* 
(0.0135) 
-0.0273 
(0.0284) 
-0.1713*** 
(0.0211) 
 0.1675*** 
(0.0198) 
-0.0178*** 
(0.0066) 
Tang  0.1420*** 
(0.0259) 
 
 0.0937*** 
(0.0174) 
 
 0.0556*** 
(0.0129) 
 
 0.0262** 
(0.0104) 
 
 0.0330 
(0.0220) 
 
-0.0118 
(0.0164) 
 
 0.0594*** 
(0.0153) 
 
-0.0051 
(0.0051) 
  
R2 within  0.0180  0.0113  0.0054  0.0046  0.0063  0.0187  0.0232  0.0017 
R2 betw.  0.0001  0.1453  0.0192  0.2038  0.0186  0.0055  0.0883  0.0101 
R2 overall  0.0011  0.1086  0.0171  0.1454  0.0091  0.0084  0.0290  0.0044 
Corr (ui, x) -0.4039        
 
     
-0.0288 -0.1103  0.2157 -0.3398 -0.1441 -0.5168 -0.0010
F  22.71*** 
 
 14.08*** 
 
  6.66*** 
 
  5.74*** 
 
  7.84*** 
 
 23.54*** 
 
 29.32*** 
 
  2.05* 
 
Hausman specification test for fixed versus random effects panel estimation 
χ2 (4) 215.87***  30.17***  17.54***  26.13*** 225.09*** 221.06*** 
 
204.09*** 
 
 19.22*** 
  
*, ** and  ***, significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively, using a two-tailed t-test.  All dependent and independent variables are scaled by total 
assets. TLIABS refers to total liabilities, which is defined as the sum of total long term debt and total current liabilities; TLTD refers to total long term debt 
(repayable in more than one year); BBGT1 refers to bank borrowing repayable in more than one year; LTSD refers to long term securitised debt; TCL refers 
to total current liabilities; TTCE refers to total trade credit and equivalent; BBLT1 refers to bank borrowing repayable in less than one year and STSD refers to 
short-term securitised debt.  White-adjusted  (White, 1980) standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 3 
Comparison of Pooled OLS and Fixed Effects Estimation Results 
 
Hypothesis 
 
Correlation 
 
Expected Sign 
 
Test of Hypothesis 
 
      Pooled OLS Fixed Effects
H1 
 
MTB and LT debt 
 
-ve 
 
Reject 
 
Reject (TLIABS and TLTD lose sig.) 
  
H2 
 
MTB and ST debt 
 
+ve 
 
Fail to Reject (Reject for BBLT1) 
 
Reject for TCL and BBLT1 (TTCE and STSD loses sig.) 
 
H3 
 
Size and LT debt 
 
+ve 
 
Fail to Reject 
 
Fail to Reject 
 
H4 
 
Size and ST debt 
 
-ve 
 
Reject (Fail to Reject for BBLT1) 
 
Reject (BBLT1 and STSD become positive but STSD loses sig.) 
 
H5 
 
Profitability and all debt 
 
-ve 
 
Fail to Reject 
 
Fail to Reject (Reject for BBLT1, TCL loses sig.) 
 
H6 
 
Tangibility and LT debt 
 
+ve 
 
Fail to Reject 
 
Fail to Reject 
 
H7 
 
 
Tangibility and ST debt 
 
 
-ve 
 
 
Fail to Reject (Reject for STSD) 
 
 
Reject (BBLT1 reverses sign to become positive, TCL and STSD also 
reverse sign, but lose sig., TTCE loses sig.) 
 
TLIABS refers to total liabilities, which is defined as the sum of total long term debt and total current liabilities; TLTD refers to total long term debt (repayable in 
more than one year); BBGT1 refers to bank borrowing repayable in more than one year; LTSD refers to long term securitised debt; TCL refers to total current 
liabilities; TTCE refers to total trade credit and equivalent; BBLT1 refers to bank borrowing repayable in less than one year and STSD refers to short-term 
securitised debt.  
 34
Table A1 
Descriptive Statistics – Debt Elements: Means (Medians) 
          TLIABS TLTD BBGT1 LTSD TCL TTCE BBLT1 STSD Obs
          
          
1991 0.4941 
(0.4900) 
0.0858 
(0.0569) 
0.0472 
(0.0036) 
0.0373 
(0.0096) 
0.4077 
(0.3890) 
0.3074 
(0.2918) 
0.0849 
(0.0518) 
0.0144 
(0.0045) 
884 
 
 
1992 0.4936 
(0.4849) 
0.0910 
(0.0617) 
0.0503 
(0.0045) 
0.0394 
(0.0097) 
0.4041 
(0.3880) 
0.3052 
(0.2897) 
0.0811 
(0.0467) 
0.0149 
(0.0039) 
925 
 
 
1993 0.4862 
(0.4705) 
0.0867 
(0.0574) 
0.0436 
(0.0018) 
0.0426 
(0.0087) 
0.3971 
(0.3846) 
0.3090 
(0.2959) 
0.0685 
(0.0341) 
0.0154 
(0.0038) 
906 
 
 
1994 0.4963 
(0.4823) 
0.0890 
(0.0520) 
0.0433 
(0.0024) 
0.0393 
(0.0076) 
0.4010 
(0.3841) 
0.3270 
(0.3171) 
0.0597 
(0.0255) 
0.0153 
(0.0029) 
831 
 
 
1995 0.4989 
(0.4963) 
0.0908 
(0.0658) 
0.0463 
(0.0050) 
0.0421 
(0.0094) 
0.4075 
(0.3943) 
0.3252 
(0.3142) 
0.0616 
(0.0324) 
0.0173 
(0.0036) 
859 
 
 
1996 0.4908 
(0.4893) 
0.0920 
(0.0667) 
0.0480 
(0.0080) 
0.0427 
(0.0088) 
0.3967 
(0.3872) 
0.3229 
(0.3098) 
0.0530 
(0.0267) 
0.0168 
(0.0036) 
843 
 
 
1997 0.4894 
(0.4825) 
0.0972 
(0.0715) 
0.0518 
(0.0082) 
0.0430 
(0.0091) 
0.3913 
(0.3798) 
0.3201 
(0.3101) 
0.0534 
(0.0254) 
0.0143 
(0.0038) 
753 
 
 
Difference 
(1991-97) 
-0.0047         
         
 0.0114** 0.0046 0.0057* -0.0164** 0.0127* -0.0315*** -0.0001
 
Note: All variables normalised by total assets. TLIABS refers to total liabilities, which is defined as the sum of total long term debt and total current liabilities; 
TLTD refers to total long term debt (repayable in more than one year); BBGT1 refers to bank borrowing repayable in more than one year; LTSD refers to 
long term securitised debt; TCL refers to total current liabilities; TTCE refers to total trade credit and equivalent; BBLT1 refers to bank borrowing repayable in 
less than one year and STSD refers to short-term securitised debt. Test for significance of change in means from 1991 to 1997 based on two sample 
difference in means t-test.  *, ** and  ***, significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. 
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 Table A2 
Descriptive Statistics – Explanatory Variables: Means (Medians) 
Variable MTB Logsales Earnings Tangibility Obs 
      
      
1991 1.4617 
(1.3191) 
11.0512 
(10.8788) 
0.1602 
(0.1607) 
0.3500 
(0.3204) 
884 
 
 
1992 1.3578 
(1.2406) 
11.1003 
(10.9257) 
0.1514 
(0.1545) 
0.3666 
(0.3361) 
925 
 
 
1993 1.3156 
(1.2053) 
11.1469 
(10.9224) 
0.1390 
(0.1438) 
0.3771 
(0.3454) 
906 
 
 
1994 1.4319 
(1.2805) 
11.2451 
(11.0132) 
0.1264 
(0.1346) 
0.3776 
(0.3467) 
831 
 
 
1995 1.4964 
(1.3290) 
11.2548 
(11.0636) 
0.1214 
(0.1284) 
0.3642 
(0.3280) 
859 
 
 
1966 1.5529 
(1.3633) 
11.3737 
(11.1976) 
0.1250 
(0.1307) 
0.3521 
(0.3143) 
843 
 
 
1997 1.5747 
(1.3764) 
11.5471 
(11.3785) 
0.1308 
(0.1344) 
0.3522 
(0.3091) 
753 
 
 
Difference 
1991-97 
0.1129*** 0.4959*** -0.0294*** 0.0022  
      
Note: MTB refers to the ratio of market value to book value of assets, Logsales to the 
natural logarithm of turnover, Earnings is defined as EBITDA/Total assets, and 
Tangibility refers to the ratio of net (depreciated) fixed assets to total.   The explanatory 
variables are calculated as one year lagged three year averages.  Thus, the 1991 values 
refer to the mean values for 1988-1990. 
 
 
